RuthBoekeroffersanewperspectiveonLocke’saccountofpersonsandpersonalidentitybyconsideringitwithinthecontextofhisbroaderphilosophicalprojectandthephilosophicaldebatesofhisday.Herinterpretationemphasizestheimportanceofthemoralandreligiousdimensionsofhisview.BytakingseriouslyLocke’sgeneralapproachtoquestionsofidentity,Boekershowsthatweshouldconsiderhisaccountofpersonhoodseparatelyfromhisaccountofpersonalidentityovertime.Onthisbasis,shearguesthatLockeendorsesamoralaccountofpersonhood,accordingtowhichpersonsaresubjectsofaccountability,andthathisparticularthinkingaboutmoralaccountabilityexplainswhyheregardssamenessofconsciousnessasnecessaryforpersonalidentityovertime.Incontrasttosomeneo-Lockeanviewsaboutpersonalidentity,BoekerarguesthatLocke’saccountofpersonalidentityisnotpsychologicalperse,butratherhisunderlyingmoral,religious,metaphysical,andepistemicbackgroundbeliefsarerelevantforunderstandingwhyhearguesforaconsciousness-basedaccountofpersonalidentity.TakinghisunderlyingbackgroundbeliefsintoconsiderationnotonlyshedslightonwhymanyofhisearlycriticsdonotadoptLocke’sview,butalsoshowswhyhisviewcannotbeaseasilydismissedassomeofhiscriticsassume.
